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THE NEW SINGLE COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
I. Introduction
One of the activities of the Council of Europe2 which has been most successful 
in terms of bringing about real change to the lives of the citizens of Europe is the 
enforcement of one of the most known international documents - the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms3 
( commonly referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights- ECHR). 
The Convention, which next year has its 501h anniversary, can be termed as a 
real milestone in the history of human rights protection. It has developed through 
the adoption of numerous Protocols4 some of which have added to the rights 
protected by the Convention, others of which have altered the procedural as­
pects of the Convention's operation. 
The rights protected by the Convention and Protocols include the classical hu­
man rights such as the right to a fair trial in Article 6, the right to liberty and 
security of the person in Article 5; and the liberal freedoms which include the 
right to freedom of expression provided for in Article 10 and the right to free­
dom of assembly and association in Article 11. 
The protection of human rights is stated as the Council's first aim. The ECHR 
and its application on a national level is the indication of the achievement of this 
goal in raising the profile of human rights on an international scale. The realisa­
tion of this aim has been successful only because of the mechanisms provided in 
the Convention for enforcing the rights. 
It is this system of remedying grievances which was subjected to radical reform 
by the Eleventh Protocol to the Convention, which has entered into force on 1st 
November 1998.5 In general, Protocol No 11 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) establishes a full-time, single permanent Court of Hu­
man Rights (the Court) to replace the Convention's original enforcement ma­
chinery. It is appropriately situated in the new, magnificent, glass-panelled 
Human Rights Building behind the Palais de !'Europe in Strasbourg. 
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It is recognised that the protection of individual human rights through the mecha­
nisms as provided in the original form in the Convention has proved to be the 
optimum method to attain its objectives. However, as the Chairman of the In­
formal Ministerial Conference on Human Rights stressed,6 the Convention risked 
becoming a victim of its own success. The length of time of individual proceed­
ings, back-log of cases, the mix of executive powers in the judicial process 
necessitated the need of reform. This need was increased by socio-political 
changes taking place in Europe. 
What will be dealt with in this short article is not an analysis of the substantive 
rights of the ECHR but a brief review of the reform to its control mechanisms, 
which in essence lie at the crux of the Convention itself. Due to lack of space 
only the salient points of this reform are considered. A list of reference works 
can be found at the end for further reading. 
Given the ever increasing number of applications submitted before the enforce­
ment organs of the Convention and the increasing number of Member States, 
the important question is whether this new reformed system is better able than 
its founding international document in protecting human rights particularly as 
regards managing the enormous work-load and reducing the time required for a 
final judgement to be reached. 
II. Weakness of the Original System
Workload 
The primary reason for reform was, ironically, the intensive use of this system 
of protection of rights. The system became more widely known in the Member 
States. The judgements were given particular importance on a local level and 
this attracted the attention of the citizens. All this served as an impetus for 
increased usage of the system. 
The pressure of work upon the Commission of Human Rights (hereunder re­
ferred to as the Commission) and the Court is evident in the huge number of 
applications being reviewed.7 The overload of work inevitably caused backlog 
of cases. The Commission and the Court did not have capacity to deal with the 
incoming claims. One contributing factor was that the judges were only em­
ployed part-time. 
The result of this enormous workload was that the Commission and the Court 
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were not able to perform their tasks within an appropriate length of time. This 
was in stark contrast to the exacting view taken by the Court of Article 6( 1) of 
the ECHR, according to which Member States' courts must deliver judgement 
within "a reasonable time". 
Procedure of Judicial Nature 
The original structure of enforcement of the ECHR was formed by the elaborate 
interplay of the Commission, the Court and the Committee of Ministers. A close 
look at the proceedings raised another weakness: this arrangement lacked a pure 
judicial mechanism. In practice it was difficult to accept any aspect of the proce­
dure before the Commission and the Committee as being truly judicial. 
Admittedly, the Court was and still is a genuine international court which reaches 
decisions after a an open public, adversarial process of written and oral argu­
ment. This, however, cannot be said of the other two organs. 
Proceedings before the Commission were confidential and took place in cam­
era. According to the old Article 31 (2) the report of the Commission was trans­
mitted to the Committee of Ministers and to the State concerned, though ini­
tially, not to the petitioner. If an application was declared admissible by the 
Commission, the Committee of Ministers took the final decision if the case was 
not referred to the Court. 
The Committee was a purely political body. Its members were not judicially 
independent but government representatives subject to governmental direction. 
Its proceedings were also confidential. The Member State was permitted to 
take part in the proceedings, but the individual applicant had no right to be 
heard. 
The old structure was the result of the political compromise made in drawing up 
the Convention and without which the introduction of the machinery would 
certainly have been impossible. Although these defaults were a necessity at the 
inception of the Convention, there was no legal justification for their existence, 
and reform was called for. 
Duplication of work 
Another weakness was that in the working of all the enforcement machinery 
there was substantial overlap between the functions of the various organs. This 
meant that work performed by one organ was identical and often duplicated by 
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another organ. Both the Commission and the Court examined the admissibility 
of an application. If the Commission declared an application admissible, Mem­
ber States could present their objections with respect to admissibility to the 
Court. More importantly, both the Commission and the Court examined the 
question of a breach of the Convention in the same manner. 
Increase in Member States 
One important consideration was that the enforcement system was created for a 
small number of Member States - ten or twelve. Currently the number of Mem­
ber States parties stands at forty. It goes without saying that this factor radically 
challenged the control system. The capacity of the system was overloaded and 
decision-making process was being rendered more difficult with every new rati­
fication increasing the membership of the Convention organs through more rep­
resentatives. 
III. The New System
While there was a general agreement between the Member States that a radical 
reform to the ECHR was unavoidable, consensus on the details took consider­
able time. In the preparatory sessions, the replacement of the Commission and 
the Court by one permanent court was the most debated issue in the preparatory 
discussions. On the other hand, unanimous agreement was reached on the abo­
lition of the quasi-judicial competence of the Committee of Ministers. Due to 
the far-reaching modifications being proposed, it was finally decided that the 
Protocol would create a wholly new text for the Convention, while leaving the 
content and the order of the human rights guarantees in Article 1 to 18 intact. 
Protocol 11 gives effect to the idea of merging the Commission and the Court 
and having a single court as the sole organ under the Convention.8 It dissolves 
the Commission and reduces the function of the Committee of Ministers to 
monitoring the execution of the judgements of the Court.9 Article 19 provides 
for a European Court of Human Rights which is to function on a permanent 
basis, operating full-time in Strasbourg as the sole judicial organ. The Court 
now consists of three-judge committees, seven-judge Chambers and a Grand 
Chamber with seventeen judges. The Court has a plenum which is responsible 
for administrative duties. 10 
Operation of the new procedure 
As under the past system, individual applications and inter-State applications 
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will exist side by side. What is important is the abolition of the optional charac­
ter of the individual's standing in proceedings before the Court. All applicants 11 
will have direct access to the new Court. The new Article 34 explicitly confirms 
the individual's right to bring a case before the Court. So, the right of individual 
petition is now compulsory and the competence of the Court will apply to all the 
Member States. 
As the secretariat of the Commission used to do, the registry of the Court will 
establish all necessary contacts with the applicants and, if necessary, request 
further information. Then the application will be registered by a Chamber of 
the Court and assigned to a judge-rapporteur. At this stage the complaint is 
subjected to a preliminary investigation. Any cases that are clearly unfounded 
will be sifted out of the system at an early stage and they will therefore be 
declared inadmissible. 
The judge-rapporteur may refer the application to a three-judge committee, which 
may include the judge-rapporteur. The committee may, by a unanimous deci­
sion, declare the application inadmissible. The decision is final. 12 
When the judge-rapporteur considers that the application raises a question of 
principle and is not inadmissible or when the committee is not unanimous in 
rejecting the complaint, the application will be examined by a Chamber. 
This procedure is the equivalent of the system used before the Commission. 
The Chamber composed of seven judges will decide on the merits of an applica­
tion and, if necessary, its competence to adjudicate the case. The judge-rappor­
teur will prepare the case-file and establish contact with the parties. The parties 
will then submit their observations in writing. A hearing may take place before 
the Chamber. 
The Chamber will also place itself at the parties' disposal with a view to a friendly 
settlement. 13 If no friendly settlement can be reached, the Chamber will deliver 
its judgement. 
The Chamber, according to the new Article 30, is empowered to relinquish its 
jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber. It may decide proprio motu to refer a case to 
the Grand Chamber when it intends not to follow the Court's previous case-law 
or where the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the 
Convention or its protocols. This procedure may be adopted on condition that 
none of the parties objects to it. The referral of a case involving questions of this 
kind is known to civil and common jurisdictions. 14 
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Once the judgement of the Chamber has been delivered, the parties will have 
three months to request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber for a re­
hearing. 15 However, this procedure will be restricted to "exceptional cases", i.e. 
when a case raises a serious question concerning the interpretation or applica­
tion of the Convention and its protocols or a serious issue of general impor­
tance. Article 43(2) requires a panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber to 
determine whether the request for a re-hearing is admissible. 
Although Article 43 refers to "referral" the procedure envisaged by Article 43 
has little to do with a referral. It creates a form of appellate body since there is 
a re-hearing of the case. While the judgement of the Grand Chamber under 
Article 30 takes the place of the judgement of the seven-judge chamber, a deci­
sion taken pursuant to Article 43 does not. In essence, it reviews the finding 
reached by the seven-judge chamber so that the Grand Chamber effectively 
functions as an instance of review. The Chamber's judgement will become final 
when there is no further possibility of a referral to the Grand Chamber. 
The Committee of Ministers will no longer have jurisdiction to decide on the 
merits of these cases and right to review decisions. However, as under the past 
system, it will retain its important role ands power, conferred by the Statute of 
the Council of Europe, of monitoring and supervising the enforcement of the 
Court's judgements. 
IV. Evaluation of the New System
The Convention system is completely overhauled by Protocol 11. But, has the 
goal of remedying the defects inherent in the old system been reached ? Moreo­
ver, has the reform attained its objectives successfully ? 
As a general positive note, one may submit that, after the elimination of the 
interplay of the three review organs in the old system the ECHR control mecha­
nism has changed into a wholly judicial enforcement system which reflects the 
principle of separation of powers and the rule of law. Some specific points 
deserve particular comment. 
One Court 
The part-time monitoring institutions, the Commission and the Court have ceased 
to exist. The provision for legal protection by a single court will reduce the 
delays and prevent duplication of effort and work. Essentially it replaces the 
plurality of competencies which existed in the former system with a monistic 
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judicial structure. Only one examination is carried out - not two- to establish 
whether the application is admissible and the Convention violated. 
Article 29(3) provides for a separate decision regarding the admissibility and mer­
its of a complaint. Admittedly, this Article and the requirement in Article 45(1) 
that supporting reasons be provided for decisions on the admissibility of a com­
plaint may create delays. This, however, is outweighed by the interests of justice 
which not only must be done to the applicants but must also be seen to be done. 
The Court's assumption of the filter role of the Commission will avoid the Court 
being clogged with unreasonable applications. This would shorten proceed­
ings. Moreover, the Court sitting permanently in Strasbourg, would 
enable the judges to dedicate their time wholly to decisions on applications. 
The judgements of the new Court will be delivered by four or five different 
Chambers of seven judges each. Only in exceptional cases will there be a judge­
ment by a Grand Chamber of seventeen. On this point, a valid submission was 
made by Schermers 16 that, for the development of the law one should prefer a 
Court of First Instance composed of judges from all European States operating 
in chambers and a Court of Appeal composed of seven or nine judges and charged 
only with the interpretation of the Convention. 17 Possibly this would constitute 
the last tier of the structure of the future Supreme Court of Human Rights in an 
amended ECHR. 
Seven Judge Chambers 
Article 27 ( 1) provides for the reduction in the size of the Chambers from nine 
to seven judges. The increase in the number of Member States, will increase 
the differences in the background of the judges. These two factors can lead to 
insufficient representation on the Court because not all views would be ad­
equately represented in a Chamber of seven. Nevertheless, mutual consulta­
tion between Chambers and by the usage of the referral system to the Grand 
Chamber would eliminate this problem. The small number of judges should 
make it possible to create more Chambers, increasing the capacity of the Court 
as a whole. This offers the possibility to tackle the problem of back-log of 
cases and promote the "efficiency" of the new Court. 
Composition of the Grand Chamber 
The national judge and the President of the Chamber concerned sitting in first 
instance in a Chamber of seven judges will always be able to sit in the Grand 
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Chamber of seventeen judges if the same case is treated "in appeal" when it is 
referred under Article 43. 18 Presumably this has been inserted so as to ensure 
consistency and uniformity of the main case-law of the new Court. However, 
notwithstanding the apparent valid reason for this amendment, usage of this 
provision may be objectionable. 
In essence this procedure provides for an overlap in judicial personnel between 
the Grand Chamber and the Chamber which initially heard the case. Since both 
judges who are entitled to sit in the two proceedings will be well acquainted 
with the case, there is some danger that they may influence the Grand Chamber 
in a particular path. This may increasing the risk that the Grand Chamber will 
take the same path as the seven-judge Chamber before it. A judge who has 
taken a position in deciding a legal dispute is no longer fully independent and 
impartial in his position in the same dispute. Thus the likelihood of an inde­
pendent and impartial review is diminished. If the Grand Chamber is to act on 
appeal from Chamber decisions, then the same rules for an appeal should have 
been applied to the hearing by the Grand Chamber. 
Relinquishing jurisdiction in favour of Grand Chamber 
Article 30 prescribes that a Chamber has the power to relinquish jurisdiction 
and on its own initiative and only in exceptional circumstances to refer the case 
to the Grand Chamber. This power is a clear recognition that it is the first and 
foremost responsibility and the duty of the Court itself to ensure the quality and 
consistency of its case-law. 
The Chamber may adopt this procedure, and relinquish jurisdiction in favour of 
a Grand Chamber, only on condition that none of the parties objects to it. Most 
likely, the parties will not object to the Chamber referring the case. Nonetheless, 
the fact is that should one of the parties of the case object, it appears that this 
would be time-consuming and hampering the procedure of the Court. The judges 
will have studied the case and would have already formed an opinion on relin­
quishing jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber. The need to first consult the parties 
means that the case must be postponed for some time. Then, once the permis­
sion of the parties is obtained it must again be put on the agenda. It is hoped that 
in practice the parties will not object if a Chamber has made it clear that it con­
siders adjudication by the Grand Chamber to be appropriate or even necessary. 
Referral to the Grand Chamber 
Under Article 43 any party to the case may request that the case be referred to 
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the Grand Chamber only in exceptional cases. The legitimacy of this request is 
verified by a panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber, inter alia, on the ground 
of whether the case raises serious questions affecting the interpretation of the 
Convention. Many applicants will suppose that this will apply to their cases and 
it is expected that most applicants will request referral under Article 43 to the 
Grand Chamber. Only when this whole procedure of Article 43 is applied in 
practice will it demonstrate whether the workload on the panel of judges ham­
pers the working of the ECHR enforcement system in general or not. 
Finally, the rule that where a judgement has been issued will now only be re­
viewed in exceptional cases, certainly should help to reduce the total time re­
quired for an application to be completely determined. 
V. Conclusions
Since the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights the idea that 
supervision of the substantive rights should be handled to some extent by diplo­
matic organs has considerably been modified. The increase in the number of 
applications and the widening of the membership of the Council hindered the 
efficient working of the system. All these factors necessitated a radical revision 
of the monitoring structures of the Convention. 
Through the creation of a new, full-time, single Court, the elimination of the 
separate examination of two institutions and the recognition of the right of indi­
vidual petition, the new Convention, has effectively simplified and speeded-up 
the procedure, making way for greater efficiency and changing the machinery 
into a more accessible one. Protocol 11 to the ECHR has equipped the Court 
with new, improved human rights protection machinery. This is being operated 
and will be utilised to tackle the challenges arising in a changing Europe which 
will have to be faced during the next millennium. 
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